Sunday, December 22, 2019

The Revenge Of Jarl Einar Wry-Mouth Of Orkney Against The Viking, Eyvind Úrarhorn



Eyvind Úrarhorn was a Norwegian man-of-action who supported King Olaf II Haraldsson of Norway (aka St. Olaf, r. 1015-1028) by doing such tasks as hunting down unwanted Vikings in Norwegian waters and forcing out foreign tax collectors who were trying to extort King Olaf’s borderland subjects. In 1018, however, Eyvind Úrarhorn decided to take a break from his domestic duties to go raiding abroad. His Viking expedition brought him to the British Isles, and after some pillaging, Eyvind apparently signed his crew up as mercenaries for a certain King Connor in Ireland. Unfortunately for Eyvind Úrarhorn, the contract with the Irish king brought him into hostile contact with another Viking crew that was skulking around Ireland. In the fall of 1018, Jarl Einar Wry-Mouth of Orkney (r. 1014-1020) appeared in Ireland and clashed with the Irish King Connor. Eyvind Úrarhorn, heeding his mercenary contract, joined the Irish side in the battle and fought against the army from Orkney.

King Connor and Jarl Einar Wry-Mouth met in battle at Lough Larne, in Northern Ireland. According to the accounts of the Orkneyinga Saga and the Heimskringla, King Connor won a great victory that day and forced the jarl of Orkney to retreat. The Orkneyinga Saga, describing the battle from Jarl Einar’s point of view, claimed it was a “crushing defeat with heavy loss of life” (chapter 15). The rebuffed Jarl Einar Wry-Mouth was sorely aware that a band of Norwegian mercenaries had aided King Connor during the battle, and although the jarl may not have known who commanded the mercenaries at the time, he was determined to discover who led the group and to seek revenge. For the meantime, however, Eyvind Úrarhorn enjoyed the victory and spent the rest of the year without any harassment from Orkney.

By the summer of 1019, Jarl Einar Wry-Mouth had learned of Eyvind’s part in the battle at Lough Larne, and he was keeping his agents busy searching for the Norwegian. It was at this inopportune time that Eyvind Úrarhorn decided to return home to Norway. In a curious move, Eyvind made the bold decision to plot his course past Orkney during his return trip. He might have been able to get away with this move if fate had been kinder, but the weather betrayed Eyvind Úrarhorn, forcing his ship to make landfall. Of all the places he could have been driven ashore, Eyvind was unlucky enough to find himself beached at a place called Osmundwall, located in the southern section of the Orkney archipelago.

Jarl Einar Wry-Mouth soon learned about Eyvind Úrarhorn’s presence in Orkney and he quickly mobilized his fleet, eager to exact his revenge. Before Eyvind could set sail, the jarl’s fleet descended on the Norwegian Vikings and caught them by surprise. In the encounter that ensued, there was not much of a battle, and Jarl Einar was allegedly able to take the stranded crew captive without any difficulty. According to both the Orkneyinga Saga and the Heimskringla, Jarl Einar Wry-Mouth used the situation to execute Eyvind Úrarhorn. With the Viking leader’s death, the jarl’s drive for vengeance was sated, and he ultimately let most of Eyvind’s crew return home. When King Olaf II of Norway learned of his friend’s death, he took no official act against Orkney, although he did begin to show public support for Einar’s rivals on the Orkney Islands, especially for Einar’s brother, Jarl Thorfinn the Mighty (r. 1014-1064), who traveled to Norway to meet with King Olaf II in 1020. During that very year, King Olaf II was likely pleased to learn that Einar Wry-Mouth was murdered by one of Jarl Thorfinn’s associates before the end of 1020.

Written by C. Keith Hansley

Picture Attribution: (Scenes from the Bayeux Tapestry, [Public Domain] via flickr.com and Creative Commons).

Sources:
  • Orkneyinga Saga, written anonymously approximately c. 1200, translated by Hermann Pálsson and Paul Edwards. New York: Penguin Classics, 1981.
  • Heimskringla, by Snorri Sturluson and translated by Lee Hollander. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964, 2018.  

Thursday, December 19, 2019

Hernán Cortés Reportedly Burned 17 Aztec Military Leaders To Death During Montezuma’s Captivity



On November 8, 1519, Hernán Cortés and his band of conquistadors entered the Aztec capital city, Tenochtitlan, where they met Montezuma II, the leader of the Aztecs at that time. Cortés and Montezuma were able to maintain a cordial relationship for a while, as the Aztec ruler invited the Spaniards to his feasts, allowed them to build a chapel, and let the conquistadors tour the city’s markets and temples in peace. Yet, both sides were naturally suspicious of the other, and while Cortés and Montezuma were acting amiably in public, both were secretly plotting ways to gain an advantage over their rival.

Cortés and the Spaniards especially feared that Montezuma would one day withdraw his protection and order an attack, leaving the conquistadors surrounded by foes in a hostile labyrinth of a city. Such paranoia caused the Spaniards to start brainstorming ways to gain leverage over the Aztecs. They eventually decided upon a bold plan to take Montezuma hostage, yet they hesitated in carrying out their mission, presumably waiting for some affront to occur which would justify their action.

The spark that the Spaniards were waiting for did not occur in Tenochtitlan, but back at the Spanish colony of Veracruz. Hernán Cortés had founded the settlement before marching off to Tenochtitlan, and a certain Juan Escalante was deputized as the constable of the colony during Cortés’ absence.  While Cortés was doing his part in Tenochtitlan, Escalante was seeing to Spanish interests at the colony, which brought him into contact with a leader named Qualpopoca, who led an Aztec-aligned city that the Spaniards called Almeria. In the so-called Second Letter that Hernán Cortés sent back to his liege, Charles V, it was reported that Qualpopoca deceived Escalante into thinking that Almeria wanted to submit to Spanish rule. Four Spaniards from Veracruz were sent to Almeria to negotiate with Qualpopoca, but upon their arrival, the Veracruz diplomats were ambushed and two were killed. The surviving two fled back to Escalante, who immediately gathered forces to seek revenge. According to Cortés’ Second Letter, Escalante marched with a force of 40 or 50 conquistadors (aided by thousands of allied natives) against Almeria.

Escalante’s battle at Almeria is a difficult event to gauge. Hernán Cortés, in his Second Letter, downplayed the battle to his liege, telling Charles V that the campaign against Almeria was a straight-forward success, in which Escalante crushed Qualpopoca’s army, forced the enemy to abandon the city, and then burned Almeria to the ground. Bernal Díaz del Castillo, one of Cortés’ conquistadors, had a vastly different view of the battle, which he presented in his Conquest of New Spain. In total disagreement with Cortés, Bernal Díaz claimed that the battle at Almeria was a defeat and disaster suffered by the Spaniards. Far from a steamrolling of Qualpopoca’s forces, the clash at Almeria was apparently a brutal battle. According to Bernal Díaz, a great number of Escalante’s native allies died in the attack, and around 8 of the 40-50 Spaniards who participated in the attack died from wounds sustained at Almeria—Escalante, himself, was one of those who would succumb to his wounds. Furthermore, the conquistadors’ poor showing at the battle reportedly boosted morale of the Aztecs and demoralized the communities that had been working with Veracruz. To conclude his summary of the Battle at Almeria, Bernal Díaz wrote, “It was the first defeat we had suffered in New Spain, and misfortunes, as the reader will see, were now descending upon us” (Conquest of New Spain, chapter 93-94).

Although Cortés downplayed the events of Almeria in his letter to Charles V, his actions in Tenochtitlan when he learned of the battle show that his true impression of the attack was much more aligned with Bernal Díaz than the letter let on. News of Almeria and Escalante’s death spurred Cortés and the conquistadors in Tenochtitlan to launch their plot to take Montezuma hostage. They successfully kidnapped the Aztec leader, and one of the first demands they made of their royal captive was for Montezuma to summon to Tenochtitlan Qualpopoca and other chiefs involved in the Almeria incident. According to Cortés’ Second Letter, 17 chieftains answered Montezuma’s summons, including Qualpopoca and one of his sons. They apparently did not suspect that anything was amiss, for Qualpopoca entered the city leisurely, carried on a lordly litter. Their ignorance, however, did not last long—under pressure from his conquistador captors, Montezuma had the 17 military leaders arrested and handed them over to Cortés.

According to both Hernán Cortés and Bernal Díaz, the imprisoned chieftains were interrogated (and probably tortured), and the questions of the interrogators pried for information as to how involved Montezuma was in Qualpopoca’s hostile actions. The chieftains started out by acknowledging that they were loyal to the Aztec ruler, but also insisted that Montezuma was not directly involved in the Almeria attack. As the interrogation persisted, however, the chieftains began to change their story to implicate Montezuma more and more. Satisfied with their answers, Hernán Cortés was ready to pronounce the punishment for the leaders who had killed his friend, Escalante—it would be brutal.

When it came to punishing the leaders of the Almeria incident, Hernán Cortés did not simply want recompense or apology; instead, he wanted to take the opportunity to display his power and to instill terror on the city of Tenochtitlan. What Cortés did next apparently even caught Montezuma completely off guard, and he would react worse to this decision than he had to being kidnapped by the Spaniards. Bernal Díaz vividly described the fate of the 17 chieftains in his Conquest of New Spain:

 “Cortés sentenced the captains [of Almeria] to be burned to death before the royal palace. This sentence was immediately carried out and, to prevent any interference, Cortes had Montezuma put in chains while they were being burned. The prince roared with anger at this indignity, and became even more alarmed than before” (Conquest of New Spain, chapter 95).

Written by C. Keith Hansley

Picture Attribution: (The Torture of Cuahutemoc, painted in the late 19th-century by Leandro Izaguirre, [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:
  • The Conquest of New Spain by Bernal Díaz, translated by J. M. Cohen. New York: Penguin Books, 1963.
  • https://archive.org/details/lettersofcorts01cortuoft/page/240 
  • https://www.gutenberg.org/files/32474/32474-h/32474-h.htm 
  • https://www.britannica.com/biography/Montezuma-II 
  • https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hernan-Cortes 
  • https://www.ancient.eu/Montezuma/  

Wednesday, December 18, 2019

The Opportunistic Ascendance Of Wei Man In Korean Chaoxian




Prior to the ascendance of the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BCE) over the kingdoms of ancient China, the Chinese Kingdom of Yan had spread its influence past the Yalu River into the Korean Peninsula. When King Zheng of Qin (the eventual First Emperor) captured King Xi of Yan in 222 BCE, the Korean holdings of Yan were absorbed by the growing Qin Empire. The Qin Dynasty, however, did not enjoy supremacy in China for long—massive rebellions broke out in 209 BCE, toppling the Qin emperors by 206 BCE. Civil war then broke out between the successful rebellion leaders, and from the ashes came Emperor Gaozu, who killed or subjugated all of his rival warlords by 202 BCE and founded the Han Dynasty. Emperor Gaozu appointed his childhood friend, Lu Wan, as a vassal king of Yan, including control of Yan’s Korean territory. Lu Wan abandoned his kingdom, however, and defected to the nomadic Xiongnu in 195 BCE, leaving a power vacuum in Yan, especially on the Korean frontier. It was then that a mysterious figure named Wei Man (or Wiman) made his bid for power in the unclaimed Korean lands formerly held by the Kingdom of Yan.

Little is known about the origins of Wei Man. He appears to have been a man of wealth and influence in the Yan-Korean region, but we have no knowledge about how he lived before 195 BCE. Whatever the case, he reportedly had the means and charisma to raise a personal army of over 1,000 men in the aftermath of Lu Wan’s defection, and he used this force to begin taking control of the communities of Northern Korea. Knowing that he would not be able to maintain control with a small garrison of 1,000 men, Wei Man actively assimilated himself into the culture of the natives he wished to rule. He stylized his hair and his wardrobe to make himself more palatable to the Korean population, and apparently succeeded in winning over Koreans to join his army and to support his regime. To further add to his numbers, Wei Man made an effort to recruit refugees who fled from the Han Dynasty. With this coalition of his personal army, Chinese refugees, and native supporters, Wei Man gained control of a sizable chunk of northern Korea, and eventually set up his base of operations at Wangxian (modern Pyongyang). With land and power consolidated under his rule, Wei Man declared himself King of Chaoxian (or Chosŏn), named after the Chinese designation for the land located east of the Yalu River.

Wei Man’s curious rise to power was noticed by the Han government, especially by the governors of Liaodong Province, who administered Han lands that bordered Chaoxian.  Despite this awareness, the Han authorities decided not to interfere in Wei Man’s power-grab over lands that at one point had been under Chinese imperial control. Fortunately for the upstart king of Chaoxian, the early Han rulers were inwardly-focused and more intent on consolidating and enforcing their authority on the kingdoms in the heartland of their empire, rather than expanding imperial influence into the fringe frontiers or beyond. As a result, Emperor Gaozu and his immediate successors tried to keep foreign wars to a minimum, so that they could spend their time and effort on domestic politics and policy. With this philosophy in mind, the early Han emperors made peace with the Xiongnu nomads, and condoned the existence of upstart kingdoms born on the frontiers of the collapsed Qin Empire, as was the case with both the Kingdom of Southern Yue (in the Vietnam area) and Wei Man’s Kingdom of Chaoxian in Korea. The earliest Han Emperors were content to offer these frontier kingdoms peace in exchange for non-aggression pacts and some diplomatic shows of deference.

With Han recognition of his authority as king of Chaoxian, Wei Man continued to gain power, wealth and territory in Korea. He turned his regime into a hereditary monarchy that would continue to rule the kingdom of Chaoxian independently from Han authority for many more decades. The kingdom, however, would ultimately fall when Chaoxian was invaded and conquered by the expansionist Emperor Wu of Han in a war which took place from 109-108 BCE.

Written by C. Keith Hansley

Picture Attribution: (Emperor Kangxi on an inspection tour, painted by Wang Hui (1632–1717), [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:
  • The Records of the Grand Historian (Shi ji) by Sima Qian, translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
  • https://www.britannica.com/biography/Wiman  

Tuesday, December 17, 2019

The Alcohol Exposition Of Rep. Fiorello La Guardia



The date was June 19, 1926, and the United States was struggling through the Prohibition Era (1919/1920-1933), a time in which the U.S. government cracked down on the mass-production and sale of alcoholic beverages. They did this through questionable and ineffective means that produced underwhelming and ironically lawless results.  Although the Temperance Movement and an alliance of dry politicians were in favor of Prohibition, Representative Fiorello La Guardia of New York was in no way a fan. On that June day in 1926, Representative La Guardia decided to express his dissent in a very educational public service announcement that the populace would be sure to drink up—he invited twenty people from the news industry into his Washington D.C. office and then proceeded to demonstrate to them how someone in the United States could use legal store-bought ingredients to make an alcoholic beer.

As the band of newsmen jostled for positions in Fiorello La Guardia’s Congressional office, the representative readied his ingredients. His desk was covered with glass cups and various bottles of different liquids. Like a chemistry teacher, Rep. La Guardia proceeded to hold up one of the bottles for all in the room to see. It was a non-alcoholic (or legally low-alcohol) brew—a product called “near beer.” He took this legal and accessible item and poured its contents into a glass. With that step completed, Rep. La Guardia next showed the reporters another bottle from the table. It was a container of malt extract tonic, another easily-obtainable product that was legal to own during Prohibition. After opening the bottle of extract, Rep. La Guardia raised up the glass with the non-alcoholic beverage already in it, and, upon receiving the full attention of the reporters, he made a show of pouring most of the malt extract into the near beer. After giving the concoction some time to ferment, Rep. La Guardia proclaimed that he had made a 2% beer with simply-procured, legal products. As a final touch, the representative drank the beer and sent the reporters on their way to print reports on his informative stunt.

Representative Fiorello La Guardia received rave reviews from the newspapers that attended his alcohol exposition. Dry politicians, however, balked at the gall of the man and protested. Yet, verbal jabs from his fellow Congressmen did not stop Rep. La Guardia from bringing his brewing show on the road. He was known to have done a second beer production exposition in his home state of New York. Prohibition, however, would not end in the United States until 1933.

Written by C. Keith Hansley

Picture Attribution: (Photograph of Fiorello La Guardia dated between ca. 1915 and ca. 1920, [Public Domain] via the U.S. Library of Congress and Creative Commons).

Sources:
  • http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=l000007
  • https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fiorello-H-La-Guardia 
  • https://www.pbs.org/kenburns/prohibition/media_detail/2085902822-laguardia/ 
  • https://vinepair.com/articles/la-guardia-homemade-beer/ 
  • https://www.britannica.com/event/Prohibition-United-States-history-1920-1933 
  • https://www.history.com/topics/roaring-twenties/prohibition  

Monday, December 16, 2019

That Time When A Frankish King Politely Asked His People To Not Assassinate Him



King Guntram (r. 561-593) lived at a time when the empire of the Franks was divided between several monarchs of the Merovingian Dynasty. With multiple Merovingian kings vying for primacy in the fractured Frankish sphere of influence, the 6th century was marked by prevalent warfare and intrigue. Such an atmosphere caused Guntram to be concerned and paranoid, and he took precautions to preserve his safety. According to Bishop Gregory of Tours (c. 539-594), King Guntram “never went anywhere without an armed escort. Even when he went to church, or to any other place which he wished to visit, he was always surrounded by a band of guards” (History of the Franks, VII.8). In addition to his armed bodyguards, Guntram reportedly made a public plea, asking for his countrymen to be so kind as to spare him from assassination.

King Guntram was right to be concerned. At least three of his brothers had been murdered—Chramn was burned alive, while King Sigebert and King Chilperic had both been stabbed to death by assassins. Further numbers of Guntram’s uncles and nephews had also been murdered, not to mention the other family members who met less-nefarious violent deaths in battle during the frequent Merovingian civil wars.

Hoping to be one of the few Merovingian males to have a natural death, Guntram ultimately went public with his wish for a peaceful, long life. In 584, not long after the assassination of King Chilperic, a congregation in a church of Paris watched with interest as King Guntram, surrounded by his guards, walked up to the pulpit to deliver a message. According to Gregory of Tours, the king proclaimed, “Men and women, all people present, I ask you to remain loyal to me, instead of assassinating me, as only recently you assassinated my brothers. Give me three years at least in which to bring up these two nephews of mine, who are my adopted sons” (History of the Franks, VII.8). The speech was received well by the public and word of the address spread beyond the city limits of Paris. On the response of the people to the king’s plea, Bishop Gregory of Tours claimed, “the entire population prayed to God for his safety” (History of the Franks, VII.8). King Guntrum’s public address apparently paid off, for, despite the fact that further attempts were indeed made against his life, Guntram continued to rule until his natural death in 592 or 593.

Written by C. Keith Hansley

Picture Attribution: (Miniature from the Bible Historiale, c. 1400-1425, from BL Royal 15 D III, f. 294v, [Public Domain] via picryl.com and Creative Commons).

Sources:
  • The Chronicle of Florence of Worcester translated by Thomas Forester. London: Petter and Galpin, originally published 1854.
  • https://www.britannica.com/biography/Guntram-king-of-Burgundy 
  • https://www.britannica.com/biography/Childebert-II 
  • https://www.britannica.com/biography/Chlotar-II  

Sunday, December 15, 2019

The Costly Treasury Replenishment Of Roman Consuls Titus Romilius And Gaius Veturius



In the first half of the 5th century BCE, the fledgling Roman Republic was constantly harassed by Volscian and Aequian raids. From around 494 to 455 BCE, Roman forces clashed with these marauding raiders on a near-annual basis. Nearby rival city-states of Rome would sometimes join in the Volscian and Aequian raids, making the attacks all the more dangerous and costly, as the Romans were often required to put multiple armies in the field to address threats on different fronts. By 455 BCE, the Roman Republic had apparently depleted its treasury after the decades of constant warfare. Despite Rome’s financial struggles, it was not spared that year in 455 BCE from an all-too-familiar raid—this time the Aequians attacked, threatening Rome and its ally, Tusculum.

Titus Romilius and Gaius Veturius, the Roman consuls of 455 BCE, rallied an army and set off to intercept the Aequians before the invaders did too much damage to Tusculum or to Roman lands. The Roman army found the Aequians at a place called Algidus, located not far from Tusculum, and a great battle reportedly ensued. Livy (c. 59 BCE-17CE), a Roman historian, made an account of the battle in his History of Rome, and from whatever sources he had at his disposal, Livy presented supposed statistics from that engagement.

During the battle at Algidus in 455 BCE, the Romans inflicted a massive defeat upon the Aequians, killing thousands of the invaders. As the defeated Aequians fled the battlefield, they abandoned their camp, leaving behind gear and piles of ill-gained loot. When the Roman consuls, Romilius and Veturius, saw all of this plunder which had been left behind by the defeated foe, the consuls decided to sacrifice personal gain for the good of the bankrupt republic. Livy, describing the battle and its aftermath, wrote, “in the engagement which followed the Aequians were heavily defeated, losing more than 7,000 men and a great deal of material and equipment, all of which the consuls sold, to replenish the depleted treasury” (History of Rome, 3.31). Although the Roman government was happy about the financial relief, the army serving under the consuls were irate that they were not given a cut of the plunder that they had risked their lives to obtain. A grudge developed between consuls and the military over the issue of the plunder, which lasted for the remainder of Romilius’ and Veturius’ terms of office. Unfortunately for the consuls, Rome’s disgruntled warriors were determined to have their revenge, and they would get it after the consuls relinquished their power.

As the story goes, the Roman warriors, and their representatives in government, brought Titus Romilius and Gaius Veturius to court. Livy, the aforementioned Roman historian, did not mention which exact charges were lodged against the former consuls, but he did write that the warriors ultimately won their case, and hefty fines were imposed on Romilius and Veturius. Livy reported the imposed fines based on the value of the Roman ‘as,’ which, in its earliest days was the equivalent of one Roman pound of bronze. The unit was, however, revised in 211 BCE to the sextantal as, which was equated to 1/6 of a Roman pound. Without specifying whether the value was sextantal or whole, Livy reported that Romilius paid 10,000 of the unit, while Veturius paid 15,000. It is unclear if the disgruntled warriors ever received any of the fined wealth, or if the fines simply further lined the state’s treasury.

Written by C. Keith Hansley

Picture Attribution: (Gaius Marius sitting in exile, presumably by Walter Crane (1845–1915), for Mary Macgregor’s Story of Rome, [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:
  • The History of Rome by Livy, translated by Aubrey de Sélincourt. New York: Penguin Classics, 2002.
  • http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0145%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter%3D31  

Wednesday, December 11, 2019

One Supposed Way Kavadh I Of Persia Counted His Slain Warriors



From ancient times until the modern day, governments have long prized keeping statistics and catalogs of their resources. In a war-torn age, numbers concerning manpower and military size are especially of interest. Kavadh I (r. 488-496, 498-531), a ruler of Sāsānian Persia, lived in one such age of prevalent warfare and he reportedly took very seriously the task of calculating the number of his warriors who did not return from battle. To aid him in this grim task, Kavadh I reportedly encouraged his military to follow an interesting tradition that resulted in a tangible and visible representation of how many people were lost.

According to the historian Procopius (c. 490-565), Kavadh’s warriors were required to submit a token of sorts to the Sāsānian Persian government before they left on campaign. The historian suggested that these relinquished items were usually small weapons, and if the Persian ruler was present, the warriors would place these tokens in containers set before their leader. Procopius described the alleged ceremony: “the king sits on the royal throne, and many baskets are set there before him; and the general also is present who is expected to lead the army against the enemy; then the army passes along before the king, one man at a time, and each of them throws one weapon into the baskets” (History of the Wars, I.18). After the troops passed by, the many filled baskets were reportedly sealed up, labeled, and placed in a safe location. The baskets (and the tokens locked inside) would not be retrieved until the army returned from its campaign.

As the story goes, once news of an army’s return from battle reached the Persian court, officials would race off to wherever they stored the sealed tokens to retrieve the respective baskets for the homebound army. Then, as Procopius claimed, “when this army returns to Persia, each one of the soldiers takes one weapon out of the baskets. A count is then made by those whose office it is to do so of all the weapons which have not been taken by the men, and they report to the king the number of soldiers who have not returned” (History of the Wars, I.18). Therefore, the unclaimed tokens left in the baskets could be tallied up for a broad number of who was lost in the war from that particular army, be it from death, capture or desertion. Of course, it would be just as easy to write down a head-count of the warriors, themselves, before and after their campaign, or to collect records from the officers who led the forces into battle. Yet, Procopius’ proposed ceremony, if it indeed was put into use, would certainly create a striking visible representation of the human cost of war.

Written by C. Keith Hansley

Picture Attribution: (Convivial meeting of Kai Khosrow by Hossein Qollar-Aqasi, [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:
  • History of the Wars by Procopius, translated by H. B. Dewing. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1919.