General Demosthenes’ Night Of Madness At Syracuse

In 413 BCE, Demosthenes sailed to Sicily and arrived at the outskirts of Syracuse with around seventy-three ships and thousands of troops to reinforce the Athenian camp that was besieging the city. The fresh troops and ships were much appreciated, as the Syracusans had recently captured three Athenian forts, and ships from Syracuse had even forced the Athenian expedition fleet to retreat during a later sea battle. The Athenians had always considered themselves to be unbeatable at sea, so the naval defeat was extremely troubling. Yet, the arrival of Demosthenes with his ships and men gave the Athenians a much-needed boost in morale.

Demosthenes shared the command of the Athenian expeditionary force with two other generals, Eurymedon and Nicias. Now that the expedition force was replenished, the three generals decided that it was time to attack Syracuse. After assessing the local geography, Demosthenes decided that the best way to defeat Syracuse’s defenses was to occupy Epipolae, an elevated plateau that was defended by several Syracusan camps and forts, as well as a wall. First, the Athenians tried a direct attack, marching out with siege engines to capture the wall, but the engines were burned and the assault made little progress. Thwarted, Demosthenes began to think of an alternative way to capture Epipolae. As one of the most creative and unorthodox generals in the Athenian military, Demosthenes was adept at planning unusual and surprising methods of attack. During his career, Demosthenes’ creative style of leadership had led to miraculous victories; yet, his ideas were also known to sometimes go horribly awry.

Ultimately, Demosthenes decided to try a stealth attack after dark. Around midnight, Demosthenes led his army in a roundabout path and climbed up onto the plateau from the west. The Athenians successfully arrived at the first fort of Epipolae without having been discovered. With the first step complete, Demosthenes then attacked the unprepared Syracusans, catching the garrison inside completely off guard. The Athenian forces quickly defeated the surprised warriors and captured the fortification. The battle for the fort was a complete Athenian victory, yet the overarching battle for Epipolae was about to take a dramatic turn.

Although the Athenians had successfully taken the first fort of the plateau, survivors from the defeated garrison and the noise of battle had alerted the defenders of Syracuse to the attack. Waves of Syracusans began rushing toward the fort, and the first defenders to arrive were approximately 600 warriors from one of the other forward camps on the plateau. It was a sizable force, but not enough to defeat the army that Demosthenes had led into battle. The Athenians rushed against the new arrivals and easily cut them down. As the band of 600 Syracusans gave way, the Athenians pursued them deeper into Epipolae. Yet, in their pursuit, the Athenians began to lose their cohesion and discipline, a troubling occurrence for any battle, but especially deadly at night. Consequently, the Athenian forces were in a haphazard formation when the fully-mobilized army from Syracuse arrived to assist the forts and defend Epipolae.

Unorganized and surrounded by the dark of night, the Athenians reportedly bumbled into a band of Boeotians who, along with other Spartan-aligned Greeks, were fighting on the side of Syracuse. The Boeotians entered the battlefield with discipline and attacked as a whole against the jagged Athenian lines. The shock of the Boeotian charge sent the Athenians into a panic, and, to Demosthenes’ horror, his army began to scatter into the night.

Instead of conquering Epipolae, Demosthenes now had to gather his shattered army and herd them back to camp. It was reportedly a scene of utter confusion. Many Athenians, after running off, became lost in the dark—some were said to have run straight off the plateau cliffs. Others called out to humanoid shadows in the dark, asking for watchwords. Yet, before long, the Syracusans learned the Athenian watchword and used it to lure lost stragglers to captivity or death. Some stranded warriors from the Athenian side even tried singing battle songs and other tunes that were native to their homelands. Nevertheless, such eerie songs emanating from the darkness only added to the confusion, especially when the songs of friend and foe sounded similar.

Eventually, Demosthenes and the majority of his army escaped and safely returned to camp. Yet, many were missing. Apparently, the portion of the Athenian army that fared the worst was the new arrivals that had recently sailed in with Demosthenes. As they had not yet learned the local landscape, they were the most prone to losing their way in the Sicilian countryside or falling off a cliff in the dark of night.

Written by C. Keith Hansley.

Picture Attribution: (Darkened version of “Heroes of the Battle of Marathon”, painted by Georges Marie Rochegrosse (1859–1938), [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:

• History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides, translated by Rex Warner and introduced by M. I. Finley. New York: Penguin Classics, 1972.

A Coastal Food Market Helped Syracuse Win A Sea Battle Against Athens

An Athenian coalition fleet of around 130 warships, accompanied by an army of over 7,000 men, arrived in Sicily in 415 BCE. That year, the Athenians were able to talk or cajole a few Sicilian cities into joining their side (most importantly Naxos and Catana). They also won a small land battle against the army of Syracuse, Athens’ main target in the region. It was a good start for Athens, yet the defeat suffered by the Syracusan army inspired the city of Syracuse to improve the training of its warriors and to modify the ships used by the navy. As the war in Sicily escalated over the next few years, the ability for Syracuse to adapt and innovate eventually led to their victory. Interestingly, one such advantageous feat of Syracusan ingenuity was to set up a food fair on the beach of their Great Harbor.

By 413 BCE, the Athenian coalition had been camped for a year or two outside of Syracuse. It all began as a war of walls, with Athens trying to besiege Syracuse with impromptu barricades, while the Syracusans frantically set up counter-walls to thwart the plans of the Athenians. As Syracuse was not completely cut off from the outside world, the number of defenders in the city continued to increase as more allies from Sicily and the Peloponnesus slipped past the Athenian lines and entered the city. In the final leg of the siege, there were reportedly tens of thousands of warriors committed to the battle on both sides. Although the besiegers and the besieged were at a stalemate for much of the siege, the year 413 saw a dramatic shift in the balance of power.

The shift in power was largely due to Syracuse’s efforts to build a competent navy. After Syracuse gathered and manned around eighty warships, it sent out its fleet against the Athenians. In that sea battle, the Syracusans were eventually forced to retreat. Yet, the ships were able to distract the Athenians long enough for the land forces of Syracuse (led by the Spartan general, Gylippus) to rush out and capture three forts from the besiegers. The battle was considered a great success, as, not only had they captured the fortresses, but the fleet had also proved that it could hold its own against Athens, and, with more training, practice and modifications, they could even beat the Athenians at sea. Learning from the battle, the crafty shipwrights of Syracuse reinforced the sides and prows of their ships, and also developed new ramming beaks for the front of the ships. When the next confrontation between the Athenian and Syracusan fleets occurred, Syracuse had refitted at least eighty ships with these modifications.

In addition to the improved ships, the Syracusans also brought a secret weapon to the battle—a food market. Apparently, food vendors, innkeepers, and anyone else in the city who knew how to cook, were all ushered down to the beach to set up stalls on a protected stretch of beach in Syracuse’s harbor. In effect, it was ancient fast food.

With the food stalls set up on the beach, the Syracusan fleet sailed out to attack the Athenian ships in the morning. After doing some damage, the ships of Syracuse withdrew to the beach in order to have a quick mid-day meal provided by the vendors who had set up shop by the water.  According to the historian Thucydides (c. 460-400 BCE), the Athenians had thought that the Syracusan fleet would not return until the next day. Nevertheless, the sailors of Syracuse, reinvigorated by food and refreshments offered by the citizens on the beach, immediately hopped back onto their ships and embarked on a second attack against the Athenian fleet that very same day. The quick reappearance of the Syracusan fleet reportedly caught the Athenians by surprise. The sailors of Athens were able to scramble to their ships and meet the enemy in battle, but the combination of a surprise attack with Syracuse’s naval improvements ultimately led to a Syracusan victory. It was the first time that Syracuse had won a sea battle against Athens during the war. Syracuse continued to ride that momentum and by the end of 413, they would completely devastate the Athenian fleet and destroy the Athens’ expeditionary force in Sicily.

Written by C. Keith Hansley.

Picture Attribution: (Sale of bread at a market stall, from a fresco in Pompeii, [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:

• History of the Peloponnesian War (Book IV) by Thucydides, translated by Rex Warner and introduced by M. I. Finley. New York: Penguin Classics, 1972.  

The Embarrassing Way An Athenian Fleet Broke Into The Sicilian City of Catana

In 415 BCE, Athens and its allies launched an expedition to Sicily reportedly consisting of over 130 warships, plus more than 100 smaller supply boats. Accompanying the sailors was a combined force of over 7,000 hoplite infantry, skirmishers and even some cavalry. When the expeditionary force reached Italy and Sicily, it met with a cold reception. The Italian cities were extremely suspicious of the Athenians, and they usually gave the expedition members some water and allowed the fleet to anchor offshore, but no more—after this brief show of hospitality, most Italian cities barred their gates and manned their walls. Of all the coastal cities in Italy, Rhegium behaved the friendliest toward the Athenians. It was near that city that the Athenians set up their first prolonged expedition camp. Rhegium also opened up a temporary market from which the Athenians could buy supplies, but like the rest of the Italian cities, they refused to let the foreigners inside their walls.

After resting up near Rhegium, the expedition force turned its gaze to the true target of the campaign—Sicily, especially the city-states of Selinus and Syracuse. The three generals in charge, Alcibiades, Nicias and Lamachus, had differing views on how to make their approach. In the end, Alcibiades convinced his comrades that recruiting Sicilian cities to the Athenian cause was the best first step. Following Alcibiades’ plan, Athenian ships sailed from Rhegium toward Sicily. Yet, just like in Italy, the local city-states gave the newcomers a cold reception. Messina, the city that Athens most wanted to have as an ally, refused to align with the expedition and closed their gates, although they did open up a market for trade. The city of Catana also refused to allow the Athenians inside their walls and told the fleet to keep sailing. Only Naxos allowed the expedition to freely enter their city.

Before long, the Athenian fleet encountered the powerful city of Syracuse. Here, the Athenians laid out the conditions that had to be met to avoid war. The main demand was that swaths of land be returned to Athens’ ally, Leontini. With the ultimatum delivered, the diplomats took a tour of the city and did reconnaissance work. After assessing Syracuse’s strength, the Athenian fleet began backtracking toward the camp at Rhegium, where some of their ships had stayed behind.

When the expedition force returned to Catana, they found the city slightly more willing to negotiate. The leaders of Catana reportedly invited the leading generals of the expedition to come inside the city and talk things over. This offer was accepted and the generals entered the city (presumably with some bodyguards), but left their ships and men nervously waiting outside the walls.

The Athenian generals walked into an interesting situation, to say the least. The city was in a state of disrepair, and even its walls and gates were poorly maintained. Moreover, the leaders of Catana were apparently very unpopular with their people and unrest was on the rise. With their city crumbling and their political power waning, perhaps the local leading party was willing to align with the expedition to maintain power. Alas, we will never know, for the arranged one-on-one meeting between the generals and the ruling party of Catana never occurred.

Not long after the generals had entered the city, the loitering Athenian fleet began to feel restless. Thucydides (460-400 BCE), the main historian of the period, did not provide a motive for the army’s behavior, but it is possible that they feared their leaders were walking into a trap. Otherwise, maybe the Athenians were just fed up with so many Italian and Sicilian cities closing their gates against the expedition. Whatever the case, large numbers of Athenian warriors began gathering by the walls of the city. There, the expeditionary forces saw what their generals had witnessed earlier—the city defenses were in a horrible state. Incredibly, the Athenians were reportedly able to simply push their way through the city gates without using any siege weaponry.

Once the unruly Athenian warriors had broken into the city, they found their generals were safe. In fact, Alcibiades was reportedly giving a speech to the assembled masses of the city when the worried Athenians broke down the front gate. When the generals were found safe and sound, the Athenian forces calmed down and, according to Thucydides, many decided to awkwardly “stroll about in the market-place” (History of the Peloponnesian War, Book VI, section 51).

With Athenian forces suddenly appearing in the city, the leaders of  Catana decided to flee. Alcibiades’ speech to the masses must have been well-received, for the people of Catana agreed to an alliance with Athens and decided to allow (or did not resist) the expeditionary force to build a new camp for their Sicilian campaign near the city.

Written by C. Keith Hansley.

Picture Attribution: (Black-Figure amphora depicting Achilles and Ajax playing a board game overseen by Athena, c. 510 BCE, [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:

• History of the Peloponnesian War (Book IV) by Thucydides, translated by Rex Warner and introduced by M. I. Finley. New York: Penguin Classics, 1972.

Harald Hardrada Allegedly Conquered A Sicilian Town By Pretending To Be Dead

Harald “Hardrada” Sigurdsson was the brother of the saint-King, Olaf II (r. 995-1030), and he would eventually become the last great Viking warlord of Scandinavia. Even though that was in Harald’s future, it took him a long blood-stained time to realize his destiny of becoming king of Norway. In the year 1030, Harald had to flee from his homeland after his brother, King Olaf, was killed by rebels in the battle of Stiklestad. For more than a decade, Harald stayed in a self-imposed exile, honing his military skill by becoming a successful mercenary commander, first employed by the Russ and then by the Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire.

In the service of the emperors at Constantinople, Harald Hardrada led mercenaries in campaigns that took him to places such as the Caucuses, Jerusalem, Bulgaria and Sicily. Harald’s military talents were best showcased in the Sicilian campaign. There, Harald Hardrada commanded a section of the army headed by the skilled general, George Maniakes, who, from 1038 to around 1041, brought most of the island of Sicily back under the control of Constantinople. The Greek historians, such as Michael Pseullus and John Skylitzes, largely erased Harald from their accounts of the Sicilian campaign. At most, they would acknowledge that foreign mercenaries were present on the island and that Harald, or “Araltes” as the Greek scholars would sometimes call him, accomplished some impressive feats while on Sicily. They, however, reserved their highest praise for George Maniakes, who, by 1039, had conquered most of the island, and was said to have personally captured thirteen Sicilian cities.

Scandinavian sources gave more credit to Harald for the Sicilian campaign. Snorri Sturluson (c. 1179-1241), in his saga about King Harald’s career, wrote of four impressive sieges that Harald orchestrated in Sicily. Unfortunately, Sturluson did not provide any names for the four towns, and the accounts could very well be more folklore than fact. Nevertheless, the tales about Harald’s achievements in Sicily showcase his military ingenuity and gives insight into the fearsome reputation that he achieved in 11th-century Europe.

In the Sicilian campaign, Harald often had too few troops to directly storm a town, so he had to either starve his enemies into submission, or defeat them with cunning. In the case of Harold’s fourth siege, ingenuity was apparently the only available option—the town was too well defended for an assault and too well supplied for a prolonged siege. To add to the frustration, Harald Hardrada fell ill while he was camped outside the city’s walls.

Whether or not he was truly sick is unknown. Did his weakened condition give him inspiration, or was it all a ploy from the beginning? Sturluson did not provide an answer in the saga. Whatever the case, Harald stopped making appearances and stayed in bed. If someone wanted to talk, they had to seek the bedridden commander in his tent. Something was so visibly amiss that even the besieged townspeople believed that Harald was gravely ill.

After more time had passed and Harald still had not been seen or heard, death was on everyone’s minds. Eventually, the grief-stricken mercenaries requested a parlay with the townspeople, proclaiming that their leader was dead. The soldiers explained to the townspeople that Harald had been a Christian prince of Norway, the brother of Saint Olaf, and on his deathbed he had wished for his body to be put to rest in one of the town’s beautiful churches.

As the story goes, the townspeople did not want to deprive the Christian prince of a proper funeral, so they agreed to entomb the body inside their city. Sturluson left much of the agreement vague, but the funeral was apparently quite the ceremonious spectacle. The clergymen of the town were said to have shown up in their robes to the entrance of the gate. There, the clergymen awaited an honor guard of Harald’s best soldiers, who respectfully carried a large coffin on their shoulders. They brought the morbid box out from the mercenary camp and approached the audience at the gate. It is unclear what they had planned—whether the soldiers would have been let inside the town, or if the coffin would have been handed over to the townspeople. It does not matter, the funeral never reached that point.

As the Scandinavian honor guard solemnly marched toward the open gate, their steps became more purposeful and their speed began to gradually increase. When they finally reached the gate, the procession of grieving Scandinavians had transformed into a band of hardened soldiers determinedly charging toward the open doors.  Before the townspeople could react, the mercenary honor guard jammed the gate open with the wooden coffin that they had been carrying. Then, they readied their weapons and kept the gate clear until the whole of Harald’s army came rushing through the open gate into town. Harald supposedly showed no mercy to the inhabitants of the town or to the plentiful wealth that was stashed inside. The loot that Harald Hardrada acquired from this and other conquests gave him such riches that he was able to purchase half of Norway from his nephew, King Magnus the Good, in the year 1045.

Written by C. Keith Hansley.

Picture Attribution: (14th-century depiction of the Funeral of Jeanne of Bourbon, wife of Charles V, [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:

• John Skylitzes. A Synopsis of Byzantine History: 811-1057, translated by John Wortley. Original text c. 11^th or early 12^th century. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
• King Harald’s Saga, by Snorri Sturluson, translated by Magnus Mangusson and Hermann Pálsson. New York: Penguin Books, 1966, 2005.  
• https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/psellus-chrono04.asp 
• https://www.britannica.com/biography/Harald-III-Sigurdsson 
• http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100130762

The Future King Of Norway, Harald Hardrada, Supposedly Conquered A City By Playing Sports

From around 1038 to 1041, the Byzantine Empire’s talented general, George Maniakes, carried out a military campaign that led to the momentary conquest of the island of Sicily. Harald Sigurdsson, also known as Harald Hardrada or Harald the Ruthless, was one of the foreign mercenaries that took part in the campaign. He would later become King Harald III of Norway, but for now, he was leading the Varangian Guard, the most renowned mercenary company in the empire that took orders only from the Byzantine emperor.

The Greek historians, such as Michael Pseullus and John Skylitzes, mainly focused on the actions of George Maniakes in their commentaries on the Sicilian campaign. They acknowledged that foreign mercenaries were also present on the island and some admitted that Harald Hardrada accomplished impressive feats while in Sicily. They, however, reserved their highest praise for George Maniakes, who, by 1039, had conquered most of the island, and was said to have personally captured thirteen Sicilian cities.

Nevertheless, the future Norwegian king received more recognition from his Scandinavian peers. The great Icelandic historian and saga writer, Snorri Sturluson (c. 1179-1241), wrote a dramatic account of Harald’s war-torn life in King Harald’s Saga. In it, Sturluson claimed that Harald led his band of mercenaries in four successful sieges against Sicilian cities. Although each of these four supposed sieges were accomplished through very unique and memorable means, today we will only focus on the third city that Harald attacked.

After taking one city by setting it on fire, and another by tunneling under its walls, Harald Hardrada came across a third city that was populous and wealthy. The settlement was described as having strong walls, a moat, and enough supplies to last through a long siege. In addition, Harald thought that the local garrison in charge of the defense of the city looked competent enough to repel anyone trying to scale the walls with ladders. According to Sturluson, the defenders lined up on their walls and opened their gate, beckoning the invaders to attack. Still wary, the future king held his troops back and made camp.

Instead of storming the city, Harald marched his men over to a spot that was out of range from enemy projectiles and then had his men remove their equipment to start playing sports and games. Harald kept his troops playing these games (in shifts) for several days. With time, the besieged town took interest in the spectacle and people would crowd the walls to have a look at the ongoing competitions. As the days went on, the city grew lazy with its defense—spectators on the walls were unarmed and they would habitually leave their gate open.

On a certain day, the sporting event was being held as usual. This time, however, the competing mercenaries looked a little bulkier than usual; they had on hoods or large hats, and their clothing was looser than usual. The city defenders realized too late that the athletes were wearing helmets under their headgear and had swords stowed away under their tunics. Each soldier that happened to be playing a sport that day suddenly rushed toward the city’s open gateway. The defenders, unprepared and surprised, managed to keep this first wave of attackers from fully entering the city, but they could not close the gate. Then, as planned, Harald Hardrada charged in with his remaining band of fully equipped mercenaries and pushed his way into the city through the opening. The town fell shortly after that, but the assault was said to have been the most costly attack that Harald enacted in Sicily, primarily because the first wave of his soldier-athletes were wearing very little armor when they entered combat.

Written by C. Keith Hansley.

Picture Attribution: (A game from the Cantigas de Santa Maria, c. 1280, [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:

• John Skylitzes. A Synopsis of Byzantine History: 811-1057, translated by John Wortley. Original text c. 11^th or early 12^th century. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
• https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/psellus-chrono04.asp 
• https://www.britannica.com/biography/Harald-III-Sigurdsson 
• http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100130762  

The Avian Air Force Of The 11th-Century Harald Hardrada

From 1038 to around 1041, the Byzantine Empire’s skilled general, George Maniakes, conquered the island of Sicily. Present with Maniakes in Sicily, was one of the more unique figures from medieval history—Harald Sigurdsson, also known as Harald Hardrada or Harald the Ruthless. He would later become King Harald III of Norway, but for now, he was biding his time as a mercenary in the Byzantine Empire’s Varangian Guard, all the while amassing wealth and prestige from his military exploits.

The Greek historians, such as Michael Pseullus and John Skylitzes, who later wrote about the time period, largely erased Harald from their accounts of the Sicilian campaign. At most, they would acknowledge that foreign mercenaries were present on the island and that Harald, or “Araltes” as they would sometimes call him, accomplished some impressive feats while on Sicily. They, however, reserved their highest praise for George Maniakes, who, by 1039, had conquered most of the island, and was said to have personally captured thirteen Sicilian cities.

Harald Hardrada received more recognition from his Scandinavian peers. The great Icelandic historian and saga writer, Snorri Sturluson (c. 1179-1241), wrote a dramatic account of Harald’s war-torn life in his text, King Harald’s Saga. In the saga, Sturluson claimed that Harald led his band of Scandinavian mercenaries in four successful sieges against Sicilian cities. Although each of these four supposed sieges were accomplished through very unique and memorable means, this article focuses only on the first city that Harald attacked.

The first unnamed settlement that Harald was said to have besieged was described as being very large and populous, surrounded by walls that were too well-built to be knocked down with siege engines. Harald could not afford to wait until the population starved, for he had reports alleging that the city was well provisioned in food and water.

As he stared at those impenetrable walls, Harald Hardrada soon realized that the city hosted an abundance of wildlife—birds were constantly flying to and fro between the city and the nearby woods. With a plan in mind, Harald pulled together a team of his best birdcatchers. When his trappers were assembled, Harald told them to go catch as many birds as they could find that had flown from the city to the forest. When the mercenaries had assembled their battalion of birds, Harald was said to have had the poor creatures covered with flammable materials, which had earlier been smeared with wax and sulfur. Sadly for the birds, when the creatures had been given their combustible coverings (presumably set up like a fuse), Harald set them on fire and shooed the poor animals back toward the city.

Acting like mobile candles, the birds were able to fly back into the Sicilian city, where they returned to their nests on the rafters, underneath the flammable medieval roofs. Soon, at least according to the saga, the whole city was ablaze, and the distraught inhabitants evacuated the town and surrendered to the triumphant Harald Hardrada.

Written by C. Keith Hansley.

Picture Attribution: (Birds in a dark and cloudy sky, [Public Domain] via pxhere.com).

Sources:

• John Skylitzes. A Synopsis of Byzantine History: 811-1057, translated by John Wortley. Original text c. 11^th or early 12^th century. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
• King Harald’s Saga, by Snorri Sturluson, translated by Magnus Mangusson and Hermann Pálsson. New York: Penguin Books, 1966, 2005.
• https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/psellus-chrono04.asp
• https://www.britannica.com/biography/Harald-III-Sigurdsson
• http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100130762