The Folkloric Origin Tale Of Kunmo Liejiaomi

The Wusun were one of several nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples in Asia who were literally pushed around by a powerful nomadic confederation known as the Xiongnu. Shanyu Maodun, leader of the Xiongnu from approximately 209 and 174 BCE, was said to have indirectly caused chaos for the Wusun people by driving a group known as the Yuezhi into Wusun territory near the end of his reign. The then khan, or kunmo, of the Wusun was reportedly named Nandoumi, and he fought back against the Yuezhi incursion into his land. Nandoumi, however, died in battle and the Wusun people had to flee to the Xiongnu for protection. During the retreat, possibly due to politics after the kunmo’s death, Nandoumi’s young son, Liejiaomi, was reportedly left behind to face the wild alone.

Yet—as folkloric origin stories of kingly or heroic figures often go—mother nature and her animals took pity of young Liejiaomi and cared for the abandoned boy during this vulnerable time. Grand Historian Sima Qian (c. 145-90 BCE), citing an explorer who interacted with the Wusun, wrote that Liejiaomi, “then only a baby, was cast out in the wilderness to die. But the birds came and flew over the place where he was, bearing meat in their beaks, and the wolves suckled him, so that he was able to survive” (Shi Ji 123). Living on bird regurgitation and wolf milk, Liejiaomi stayed alive long enough to be rediscovered by the Xiongnu, who were impressed by his survival skills. By this time Shanyu Jizhu was reportedly in power, a position he would have over the Xiongnu from around 174 to 159/158 BCE. As the stories go, Jizhu gave shelter to Liejiaomi and took interest in raising the boy, encouraging his education in the ways of leadership and war.

When Liejiaomi grew to adulthood, he was given a military command and eventually was supported by the shanyu in becoming the next kunmo of the Wusun. In conjunction with the Xiongnu, Kunmo Liejiaomi was able to have his revenge against the Yuezhi, pushing them westward toward the region of modern Uzbekistan, allowing for the Wusun to claim the vacated land left by the Yuezhi. Despite this partnership, Kunmo Liejaomi and the Wusun would eventually be recruited by the expansionist Emperor Wu of Han China (r. 141-87 BCE) to combat the Xiongnu.

Written by C. Keith Hansley

Picture Attribution: (Painting from the Xiongnu exhibit in Henan Provincial Museum, Zhengzhou, photographed by Gary Todd for worldhistorypics.com, [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:

• Records of the Grand Historian (Shi ji) by Sima Qian, translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
• http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Altera/wusun.html  

The Nighttime Sandstorm Maneuver Of Wei Qing In 119 BCE

In the spring of 119 BCE, Emperor Wu (r. 141-87 BCE) of Han Dynasty China sent his greatest duo of military generals—the uncle and nephew pair of Wei Qing and Huo Qubing—to attack the Xiongnu Confederation, a group of nomadic tribes then reportedly led by Shanyu Yizhixie (r. approximately 127/126-114 BCE). At the time, the Xiongnu bases of operation were set up at the north end of the Gobi desert, with a vast arid region acting as a buffer between the persistent nomads and the Han armies. Emperor Wu and the Xiongnu had been hostile since 134 BCE, and were frequently raiding and invading each other over the years. Yet, the Chinese campaign of 119 BCE was meant to be more of a knock-out punch than a mere punitive raid. According to Grand Historian Sima Qian, the emperor raised an enormous “force of 100,000 cavalry, along with 140,000 horses to carry baggage and other equipment (this in addition to the horses provided for transporting provisions)” (Shi Ji 110). This was a huge portion of the Han Empire’s horse population that was being gambled on the mission of 119 BCE. In addition to the horde of horsemen and horses, Emperor Wu also reportedly mustered several hundred thousand infantrymen to accompany the cavalry into battle.

Before the troops left Han territory, the huge Chinese army was split between the personal commands of Wei Qing and Huo Qubing. According to Sima Qian, the cavalry force was equally divided, with each of the two generals receiving 50,000 horsemen. As to the division of the even greater number of infantrymen, Sima Qian was less specific, yet this body of troops was also divided between the two main Chinese leaders in some way. When the forces had been adequately arranged, Wei Qing, the more experienced of the Han military leaders, and general-in-chief of Emperor Wu’s armed forces, set from the vicinity of Dingxiang. Huo Qubing, too, began his march, but he took a different path than his colleague, and started instead from Dai Provence. Both forces entered the Gobi Desert and braced for the grueling challenge of marching huge forces through an inhospitable environment.

The Xiongnu, according to the Chinese sources, often had an effective system of spies and informants. In 119 BCE, as in other times, the Xiongnu quickly learned of the Han invasion. The information put Shanyu Yizhixie in a dilemma—should he flee or fight. After deliberating with his friends and advisors, the shanyu ultimately chose to enact both choices at the same time. He sent his camp supplies, valuables and civilians further north, but personally remained at the edge of the Gobi Desert with an army of experienced Xiongnu warriors. His decision to engage the huge Chinese force was reasonable, as when the Han armies appeared at the north end of the desert, they would be fatigued and weakened from their trek through the Gobi. Furthermore, due to the competence of the Xiongnu spies and scouts, the shanyu was able to accurately predict where the two Han armies would appear on the north end of the desert.

After a rough journey, in which a great many horses likely died, the Han forces finally reached the opposite end of the Gobi, only to find another challenge awaiting them. Shanyu Yizhixie had deployed his troops to intercept both of the Han armies. Yizhixie personally led a force to challenge Wei Qing, while several minor Xiongnu kings led a force against Huo Qubing. The Xiongnu had a great many advantages for the battle—they chose the location of the fight, were familiar with the surroundings, and were well rested in contrast to the exhausted Han armies that were dragging themselves out of the desert. Yet, if there were Han generals who could even the odds back into their own favor by sheer strategy and instinct, it was Wei Qing and Huo Qubing.

Wei Qing met Shanyu Yizhixie’s forces at the edge of the desert sometime during the day, and when they made first contact, neither side was eager to start a full-scale battle at that time. Instead, the shanyu and Wei Qing engaged in small skirmishes with fractions of their cavalry forces, while the rest of the Xiongnu and Han troops remained in their respective camps. This status quo of contained small-scale prodding and testing continued until late in the day, and neither side had achieved much progress as sunset began to splash color on the sky. As the sun started to disappear below the horizon, the environment soon provided an opportunity that could be utilized by an attentive general.

As the story goes, a huge sandstorm swept over the battlefield. Although there was still some light, the sand storm was thick enough to make the opposing forces blind to the actions of the other. Wei Qing recognized the chance immediately and masterfully set about maneuvering his forces with great speed. Under the cover of the swirling sands, Wei Qing rushed his forces out of camp and, remembering the position of the enemy, sent his troops to quickly encircle the shanyu’s troops. When the sands finally died down and the battlefield became visible once again, Yizhixie and the Xiongnu were shocked to find themselves completely surrounded by Wei Qing’s huge force. The shanyu, finding himself so outmaneuvered, reportedly lost the will to continue the fight, and instead focused all his efforts on escape.

According to Grand Historian Sima Qian, Shanyu Yizhixie ultimately decided to ram his way through the Han encirclement and flee north. To do this, the shanyu gathered together several hundred of his most trusted, toughest, horsemen, and with these men he charged at a weak point in Wei Qing’s lines. Yizhixie did indeed escape, but in doing so he left behind thousands of his warriors. Either these abandoned troops were given the command to scatter in all directions, or they began to flee when they saw their leader gallop off into the night. Whatever the case, the Han forces had a wild night, with Xiongnu forces pressing out against the encirclement in all directions. Many of the nomads, like their shanyu, were able to escape, but their casualties were great—by dawn Wei Qing had reportedly killed or captured around 10,000 Xiongnu. Yizhixie ultimately escaped his Chinese pursuers, but by the time Wei Qing returned to Han territory, he had killed or captured an additional 9,000 Xiongnu.

Although Wei Qing had performed an impressive maneuver against Yizhixie and had dealt some major blows to the Xiongnu, he faced an underwhelming reception back in the court of Emperor Wu. This happened because Huo Qubing totally outshined his uncle during the 119 BCE campaign. Huo Qubing, in his battle against the shanyu’s subordinate kings, had obliterated the opposing forces on the battlefield. According to Grand Historian Sima Qian, Huo Qubing killed or captured a total of 70,443 Xiongnu before the end of his campaign. Yet, the Han successes had come at an incredible cost. Of the giant horde of horses that the Chinese dispatched into the desert, only around 30,000 were said to have survived the campaign. Similarly, although the Han had inflicted between 80,000 and 90,000 casualties on the Xiongnu, the Chinese also lost tens of thousands of their own troops.

Written by C. Keith Hansley

Picture Attribution: (Ancient Han Dynasty figurines from the National Museum/ China through the Ages, Exhibit 4, photographed by Gary Todd, [Public Domain] via worldhistorypics.com and Creative Commons).

Sources:

• The Records of the Grand Historian (Shi ji) by Sima Qian, translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

The Drunken Defeat Of The Xiongnu In 124 BCE

Wei Qing was one of the most talented military leaders in the service of Emperor Wu (r. 141-87 BCE). He became a general in 129 BCE, and quickly went to work battling the emperor’s greatest foes at the time, the nomadic Xiongnu confederation. Wei Qing successfully maneuvered against Shanyu Junchen of the Xiongnu in annual campaigns between 129 and 127 BCE. His successes in these missions gave Emperor Wu enough confidence in the general to give Wei Qing a trial run as general-in-chief of the entire Han military. This hands-on audition took place in 124 BCE, when Wei Qing was put in command of six other generals and given a force of around 100,000 men to direct as he saw fit. After accepting this responsibility, Wei Qing dispatched his troops, some from Shuofang, and others from Gaoque, leading them on a campaign into hostile Xiongnu territory, which was, at that time, ruled by Junchen’s successor, Shanyu Yizhixie.

The invasion by this large Chinese force did not go unnoticed by the Xiongnu. An unnamed “Wise King of the Right”—one of the powerful lieutenants of the Shanyu—had been briefed on the Chinese incursion into Xiongnu territory. The Xiongnu king, however, thought that the Chinese forces were too far away to do him any harm for the foreseeable future, as his Xiongnu army was a considerable distance away from the Han Empire’s frontier that Wei Qing had just passed. According to Sima Qian (c. 145-90 BCE), Emperor Wu’s Grand Historian and palace secretary, the carefree Wise King of the Right decided to allow his troops to enjoy themselves in revelry before they had to eventually react to the incoming Chinese army. In this calm before the storm, the Xiongnu discipline was relaxed and drinking was prevalent in the Wise King’s camp.

Unfortunately for the Xiongnu, Wei Qing possessed the skills shared by most of the greatest generals of the ancient world—speed and surprise. While the Wise King of the Right was partying with his troops throughout the day and night, Wei Qing had been relentlessly marching his army deep into Xiongnu territory with incredible speed. Before the first light of dawn began to brighten the morning sky, Wei Qing successfully found the Xiongnu camp and set about encircling the force of the Wise King of the Right. Although the Chinese forces were not visible in the darkness, something tipped off the Xiongnu to the hostile presence that was lurking just out of eyesight—perhaps, it was the rattling of equipment wielded by 100,000 warriors.

By this point, the Wise King of the Right had drunk himself into a stupor. Yet, the sounds of Wei Qing’s forces became so loud that the Xiongnu leader was roused from his haze. Caught off guard as he was, the Xiongnu king allegedly gave up any hope of winning the battle by means of force or strategy. Instead, he devoted all of his then-inebriated mental capacity to devising a way to personally escape from the encircling Chinese forces. In that tipsy and surprised state, the best plan that the Wise king could concoct was to grab his favorite concubine, rally his most able horsemen, and with this small band speed off into the night, hoping to hit a weak spot in the Chinese lines. This plan, interestingly enough, was successful for the king, as he did indeed punch through the Chinese forces and escaped north. Although the Wise King of the Right successfully escaped, he had unfortunately abandoned thousands of his Xiongnu countrymen in the process.

Wei Qing then attacked the leaderless Xiongnu camp and defeated the unprepared and disorganized foe with relative ease. According to Sima Qian, the battle led to the capture of 15,000 Xiongnu (including ten minor kings) and over 100,000 animals. With this victory complete, Wei Qing led his army and captives back into Han territory. Upon the general’s return, the pleased Emperor Wu added more land to Wei Qing’s fiefdom and made the military leader’s title of general-in-chief an official appointment.

Written by C. Keith Hansley

Picture Attribution: (Special Exhibit/ Xiongnu, Henan Provincial Museum, Zhengzhou. [Public Domain] via Creative Commons. Complete indexed photo collection at WorldHistoryPics.com).

Sources:

• The Records of the Grand Historian (Shi ji) by Sima Qian, translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

The Deadly Rivalry Between Wei Qing and Li Gan

In 119 BCE, the accomplished Chinese military leader, Wei Qing, launched one of his many incursions into Xiongnu territory on behalf of Emperor Wu of Han (r. 141-87 BCE). With him was a subordinate general named Li Guang, a well-respected, but also well-aged, warrior. Although Li Guang was an inspiring officer, with a near-legendary skill with a bow, both Wei Qing and Emperor Wu had their reservations about the old general’s capabilities. Heeding these doubts, Wei Qing decided to remove Li Guang from the vanguard of his army, and instead sent him to reinforce the army’s right flank. Yet, while Li Guang and his forces were traveling to their new position, they unfortunately became lost and fell behind the rest of the army. In the end, Li Guang missed the battle between Wei Qing and the Xiongnu.

Despite Li Guang’s absence, Wei Qing won the day—he nearly encircled the enemy forces, but the Xiongnu leader was able to punch through the Han lines with his cavalry and escape. After the battle, Wei Qing summoned Li Guang to answer for his absence during the battle. Officials in the army would then send a report to the emperor of both the accusations and the general’s responses. The old military leader knew from experience that such unflattering reports could lead to a general being imprisoned, stripped of his titles, and possibly executed. Therefore, the seasoned warrior arrived at the meeting with Wei Qing in a grim state of mind.  According to the Grand Historian, Sima Qian (c. 145-90 BCE), the disgruntled Li Guang appeared for his hearing and abruptly stated “Now I am over sixty—much too old to stand up to a bunch of petty clerks and their lists of charges!” (Shi JI 109). He then unsheathed his sword and cut his own throat.

Many in China mourned the death of Li Guang, but the late general’s son, Li Gan, had the most visceral reaction. Li Gan, like his father, served in the Han military, and he distinguished himself enough in battle to be given the noble rank of marquis, a title also held by the aforementioned Wei Qing. The two marquises, unsurprisingly, did not get along. Li Gan held Wei Qing responsible for driving his father to suicide and Wei Qing, in response, was irritated by Li Gan’s attitude. The friction between the two men steadily built, and, in a moment of weakness, Li Gan lost his composure and physically struck Wei Qing. The general was injured, but the wound was not serious, as Wei Qing quickly recovered and neither he or his friends filed charges against Li Gan. Unfortunately, Wei Qing’s mercy over this incident did not mean that Li Gan was forgiven.

At a later date, both Li Gan and other prominent men of the empire joined the emperor at the Palace of Sweet Springs. Emperor Wu and his courtiers, as noblemen were often wont to do, decided to go on a hunting trip. Yet, the outdoor excursion would prove to be anything but calm and peaceful.

During the course of the hunt, Li Gan eventually paired up with Huo Qubing, a devoted friend and relative of Wei Qing. Unfortunately, only one of the two would survive the hunt. At an unknown time during the trip, Li Gan was found dead and his body contained a suspicious puncture wound. Huo Qubing reportedly witnessed the death and he told the emperor that the dead marquis was killed by a deer. He claimed that, as they hunted together, he and Li Gan encountered an aggressive stag. Despite both hunters being great archers, this stag supposedly rushed the noblemen and fatally impaled Li Gan with an antler. Emperor Wu, who was fond of Huo Qubing, believed (or did not question) the story and publicly backed Huo Qubing’s testimony. Sima Qian and other contemporaries, however, viewed the death with much more suspicion. By the time Sima Qian began writing his Records of the Grand Historian, he had become convinced that Li Gan was murdered:

“When the party reached the Palace of Sweet Springs, an imperial hunt was held. Huo Qubing, who was on very close terms with Wei Qing, took the opportunity to shoot and kill Li Gan. At this time, Huo Qubing enjoyed great favor with the emperor, and the emperor therefore covered for him, giving out the story that Li Gan had been gored and killed by a stag. A year or so later, Huo Qubing died [117 BCE]” (Shi JI 109).

Written by C. Keith Hansley.

Picture Attribution: (The Qianlong Emperor Hunting Hare, by Giuseppe Castiglione (1688–1766), [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:

• Records of the Grand Historian (Shi Ji 109) by Sima Qian. Translated by Burton Watson (Columbia University Press, 1993).
• http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Han/personsweiqing.html 
• http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Han/personshuoqubing.html  

Huo Qubing’s 121 BCE Spring Expedition And The Captured Golden Man

Huo Qubing was one of the most talented military generals that served during the reign of Emperor Wu (r. 141-87 BCE). His rise to prominence was greatly helped by the influence of his uncle, general-in-chief Wei Qing, and his aunt, Empress Wei Zifu—yet, once he was given an avenue to leadership, Huo Qubing seized his destiny and began building his legend through impressive military feats. His name first appeared in an imperial edict around 123 BCE, at which time Huo Qubing was something of a scout, leading a force of around 800 horsemen on missions in front of his uncle’s army. He was masterful in commanding that band of cavalry and was given the noble title of marquis as a reward for his successes. Finally, in 121 BCE, Huo Qubing was promoted to the rank of general and his troop of 800 horsemen was increased to an army of 10,000 cavalrymen.

For his first campaign as a general, Huo Qubing was sent against Emperor Wu’s greatest foe, the nomadic Xiongnu confederation. He set out from Longxi in Spring and marched deep into what is now Gansu Province, China. Crossing over mountains and rivers, Huo Qubing reportedly invaded the territories of five Xiongnu kings. He was said to have slain one or two of these kings, captured a son of another, and killed or captured between 8,000-18,000 Xiongnu warriors—all this reportedly accomplished before the arrival of summer.

The most intriguing event of the Spring campaign occurred when Huo Qubing was in battle against a certain Xiutu king of the Xiongnu confederation. While scavenging items from a battlefield or pillaging an abandoned Xiongnu camp, Huo Qubing came into possession of a curious religious idol. Emperor Wu praised the acquisition of the sacred item in a public edict, which was thankfully recorded by the emperor’s Grand Historian and palace secretary, Sima Qian (c. 145-90 BCE). The edict lauded the general’s campaign, claiming, “He has killed and captured over 8,000 of the enemy and seized the golden man which the Xiutu king uses in worshipping Heaven” (Sima Qian, Shi Ji 111).

Unfortunately, no further elaboration was given to the golden figure’s appearance. Yet, many history and religion scholars wonder if the golden man might have been a depiction of the Buddha. Supposing that the unidentified golden figure really was a Buddha, Huo Qubing’s finding of it would have been the first documented interaction between China and Buddhism. Nevertheless, as the ancient Chinese eyewitnesses of the statue did not record any distinctive features of the figure besides its golden sheen, the identity of the deity depicted by the idol remains a subject of speculation and theory.

After battling through the five Xiongnu subkingdoms and capturing the golden man, Huo Qubing returned to China, where he was rewarded with an enlargement of his marquisate fiefdom. He did not have long to rest, for in the summer of that same year (still 121 BCE), Huo Qubing would participate in yet another campaign against the Xiongnu.

Written by C. Keith Hansley.

Picture Attribution: (Romance of the Three Kingdoms scene at Long Corridor in China, [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:

• Records of the Grand Historian (Shi ji) by Sima Qian, translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 
• http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Han/personshuoqubing.html

The Bizarre Tale Of Shanyu Maodun’s Rise To Power

The Xiongnu were a coalition of ancient nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples to the north and northwest of China, who, by the late 3rd century BCE, built an empire strong enough to pose an existential threat to the Chinese Qin and Han Dynasties. The first high-chief, or Shanyu, of the Xiongnu coalition that was known to Chinese sources was Touman. He was reportedly a contemporary of the First Emperor of the Qin Dynasty in the late 3rd century BCE. In Touman’s day, the Xiongnu were powerful, but their dominance was not yet firmly established over the other nomadic peoples of the region. One such rival nomadic group was the Yuezhi, to whom Touman apparently sent his son, Maodun, as a diplomat or political hostage. Yet, all was not as it seemed, for Touman and Maodun had very little in the way of a father-son bond. According to Chinese sources, Touman simply wished that his unwanted son would disappear in order to make life easier for his more favored children, so when Maodun reached his destination, Touman immediately attacked the Yuezhi despite what they might do to his son. Faced with this awkward situation, Maodun reportedly stole a horse, fought his way out of Yuezhi territory, and escaped to friendly land.

While Touman may have been disappointed at the survival of his son, the majority of the Xiongnu contrastingly looked upon Maodun’s escape with awe. Perhaps the incident convinced Touman to give his son a second chance, or maybe the escape from Yuezhi hands boosted Maodun’s reputation enough to obligate the Shanyu to give his son a reward—whatever the case, Maodun was reportedly put in command of 10,000 horsemen.

The Xiongnu were known to train in horsemanship and archery from early childhood, but Maodun brought training to a new level when he was given a military command. His program, according to Chinese sources, focused primarily on horse-archery drills and the cultivation of blind obedience. To contribute to both of these goals, Maodun reportedly developed an arrow that whistled as it flew through the air. Wherever Maodun shot this whistling projectile, he expected his horse archers to immediately launch their own arrows in the same direction without any hesitation—those who wavered were reportedly executed.

Maodun’s training began innocently enough. He was said to have brought his horsemen on hunting trips, shooting his whistling arrows at wild game. It was a simple start, but the horsemen were told if they did not meet Maodun’s expectations in speed and accuracy, then they would be executed. When the archers no longer gave any pause to taking shots at whichever animal they were told to target, Maodun began to escalate his training program.

Once the hunting phase was over, Maodun started the real obedience training. As the tale goes, he first shot one of his whistling arrows in the direction of his favorite horse. Some of the archers apparently thought this may have been a trick command and decided not to shoot at their leader’s beloved steed—these men were unfortunately mistaken in their thinking and were promptly executed. Next, Maodun reportedly sent a whistling arrow in the direction of his wife. Again, some of the horsemen hesitated to loose their arrows, and were executed for their show of care. Finally, Maodun shot a whistling arrow at the most prized horse of Shanyu Touman. This time, after so many executions, all of Maodun’s horsemen launched their arrows without any hesitation.

Around the time of the massive Chinese revolt against the Qin Dynasty in 209 BCE, Shanyu Touman and his son, Maodun, reportedly went on a hunting trip. Unfortunately, no father and son bonding would occur on that trip. Instead, Maodun, who was accompanied by some of his unquestioning horsemen, enacted his long-awaited plan to seize power. The account of Grand Historian Sima Qian (c.145-90 BCE) on this incident was as follows:

“Accompanying his father, the Shanyu Touman, on a hunting expedition, he [Maodun] shot a whistling arrow at his father and every one of his followers aimed their arrows in the same direction and shot the Shanyu dead. Then Maodun executed his stepmother, his younger brother, and all the high officials of the nation who refused to take orders from him, and set himself up as the new Shanyu” (Shiji 110).

Under the leadership of the cunning and aggressive Maodun, the Xiongnu would conquer their fellow nomadic neighbors to create a great empire. During his long reign from about 209-174 BCE, Maodun greatly expanded his territory and often got the better of the Chinese Han Emperors.

Written by C. Keith Hansley.

Picture Attribution: (Painting of Xiongnu nomads, Henan Provincial Museum, Zhengzhou, [Public Domain] via flickr.com and Creative Commons).

Sources:

• Records of the Grand Historian (Shi ji) by Sima Qian, translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 
• https://www.britannica.com/topic/Xiongnu 
• http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/xiongnu 
• http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Altera/xiongnu.html 
• https://depts.washington.edu/silkroad/exhibit/xiongnu/essay.html  

Emperor Wu’s Attempted Trap For The Xiongnu At Mayi

The predecessors of Emperor Wu (r. 141-87 BCE) usually took a defensive approach to dealing with the Xiongnu confederation of tribes that lived in the eastern Eurasian Steppe. Previous emperors often resorted to tribute payments, marriages and trade to keep the populous nomads happy, usually only martialing their armies against the Xiongnu on occasions when the nomads raided imperial territory. Emperor Wu, although he initially followed the precedent of peace and tribute, eventually decided to shift the Han Empires' foreign policy with the Xiongnu from a defensive stance to a state of active hostility.

Emperor Wu’s first move against the Xiongnu occurred in 134 BCE. The plan must have been in the works for a long time, for it all hinged on an agent of the emperor named Nie Wengyi who had gone to the Xiongnu and built trust with them by playing the role of a smuggler. By trading contraband to the Xiongnu, Nie Wengyi came to be known and trusted by various nomad leaders, and around 134 BCE, he had finally gained the ear of the Xiongnu leader, the Shanyu. With the agent finally in position, the emperor could move into the final phases of the plan.

When the time was right, Nie Wengyi was instructed to offer the Shanyu a fateful proposal. Following an order from the Han government, Nie Wengyi went to the Shanyu and offered to help the Xiongnu take the wealthy city of Mayi, in Yanmen province. The agent apparently claimed that he could offer the Shanyu a variety of routes to securing Mayi.  He claimed that he could assassinate the high officials to disorganize the town, and he further proposed that he would likely be able to convince the city of Mayi to surrender to the Xiongnu peacefully once the loyal officials were dead. Nie Wengyi’s deep-cover relationship-building paid off, for the Shanyu responded to the plan with eager excitement instead of caution. Yet, the Xiongnu leader did make one condition—Nie Wengyi needed to assassinate the officials in Mayi before the Xiongnu would make their move. To prove that the officials were dead, Nie Wengyi was told to hang their decapitated heads from the city walls for Xiongnu spies to see.

With his mission near completion, Nie Wengyi returned to Mayi and updated all those involved in the plot on his progress. Presumably after waiting enough time for the emperor to prepare, Nie Wengyi eventually made true his promise to hang some heads on the city wall. Yet, instead of government officials, the heads belonged to local condemned criminals. When the Xiongnu spies in the region reported to their leader that there were indeed heads hanging from the walls of Mayi, the Shanyu quickly pulled together a force reportedly numbering 100,000 horsemen and crossed into Han territory at Wuzhou.

The Shanyu’s enthusiasm, however, soon began to give way to caution as he ventured further into Han territory. His concerns especially began to increase when he noticed that the countryside was eerily absent of human activity. There were no farmhands, travelers, or loitering commoners to be seen. Animals, however, were apparently roaming free and left untended in the fields. Unnerved by the sight, the Shanyu delayed his advance against Mayi and instead attacked a signal beacon station in Wuzhou. Unlike the rest of the countryside, the Xiongnu found the station still inhabited, and, as luck would have it, they managed to find and capture a local defense official in the station.

Unfortunately for Emperor Wu, the captured official knew something of the emperor’s plan at Mayi and, under interrogation, he told the Xiongnu everything he had heard. The Shanyu was shocked to learn that the seemingly empty region his horsemen were traveling through was actually in no way devoid of life. The eerie ghost town atmosphere was caused by the commoners being quarantined to their communities. Yet, despite the absence of the commoners, the Shanyu discovered that the region around Mayi was much more overpopulated than it appeared—according to Sima Qian (c. 145-90 BCE), Emperor Wu had preemptively hidden over 300,000 Han troops in the valleys around Mayi, hoping to trap the Xiongnu when they began to enter the city. In addition, yet more troops were coming from the region of Dai to attack the Xiongnu baggage train.

Tipped off to the danger, the Shanyu immediately led his forces out of Han territory. The section of the Han forces sent from Dai to attack the baggage train of the Xiongnu could have possibly cut off the Shanyu’s retreat, but when they learned that they would not be fighting just the baggage train, but the whole Xiognu horde, the warriors from Dai refused to fight. With the trap at Mayi thwarted, and the division from Dai purposefully keeping out of the way of the Xiongnu, the Han forces could only pursue the invaders to the border without inflicting any damage on their foe. It was an embarrassing debacle that eventually caused Wang Hui, one of the masterminds behind the trap, to commit suicide.

Written by C. Keith Hansley

Picture Attribution: (scene of the Chinese Campaign against Annam (Vietnam) 1788 - 1789, painted by a collaboration of Chinese and European painters c. late 18th century, [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:

• Records of the Grand Historian (Shi ji) by Sima Qian, translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

The Great Escape Of Li Guang

In 129 BCE, Emperor Wu of China sent four generals on a surprise invasion into Xiongnu territory. Each general had a separate force and launched their incursion into enemy territory from different cities. Wei Qing, one of the emperor’s most talented generals, marched into Xiongnu land from Shanggu. Gongsun He and Gongsun Ao also lead invasion forces, the first from Yunzhong, and the latter from Dai Province. Finally, Li Guang—an unorthodox but fearsome general—led his forces out from Yanmen.

We Qing was the only one of the four generals to have a truly successful campaign (as he often did) and was said to have captured several hundred Xiongnu. Gongsun He, for his part, had an uneventful trip through enemy land, making virtually no contact with any foes. The campaigns of Gongsun Ao and Li Guang were also unimpressive, but their reputations were besmirched by worse than lack of contact with the Xiongnu; instead of not finding their foes, the latter two generals were intercepted by Xiongnu armies and were defeated. Gongsun Ao lost thousands of troops in Xiongnu territory and returned home in disgrace. Li Guang, unfortunately, fared even worse—he was not only defeated by the Xiongnu, but also captured alive.

According to Grand Historian Sima Qian (c. 145-90 BCE), who claimed to have personally seen Li Guang, the Xiongnu had a deep respect and fear of the general.  By this point, Li Guang (who had joined the army in 166 BCE) had been a thorn in the side of the Xiongnu for around three decades. His name was reportedly known by the Shanyu, the leader of the Xiongnu, and an order was disseminated among the Xiongnu to capture Li Guang alive. On the battlefield, the Xiongnu were able to identify Li Guang, and, realizing he was injured, they mended his wounds and carefully placed him on a litter suspended between two horses, intending to bring him back to their leader. Unfortunately for the Xiongnu, their captive’s wounds would soon prove to not be as debilitating as they thought.

Li Guang, when he was injured on the battlefield, reportedly attempted to play dead. The Xiongnu, however, found him and recognized that he was alive, forcing Li Guang to downgrade his plan to acting unconscious. Although the Xiongnu saw through his ploy to play dead, his impersonation of unconsciousness was more convincing. Apparently only minimal guards were placed near the litter carrying Li Guang, and the nearest warrior keeping an eye on the general was virtually a child. Sensing an opportunity to escape, Li Guang suddenly sprung up from the litter and jumped onto the youth’s horse. He also commandeered the boy’s bow before knocking the young Xiongnu warrior to the ground. Now equipped with a steed and a weapon, Li Guang began his great escape.

Although the general’s tactics in the previous battle were lackluster, Li Guang’s personal fighting prowess was famous, especially with the weapon he had just picked up—the bow. Capable of consistent near-miraculous shots, he was an ancient sniper. In addition, he was a cavalry officer, and was very familiar with horses. Therefore, with his bow and his horse, Li Guang had everything he needed to survive.

As soon as Li Guang made his move and began galloping frantically for Han territory, hundreds of Xiongnu charged after him in pursuit. The fleeing general, however, knew how to shoot from horseback and was able to take down anyone who rode too close. Through this combination of fleeing and shooting, Li Guang was able to successfully weave his way back toward friendly territory. The Xiongnu eventually gave up the chase, either because of Li Guang’s accuracy or the nearing Han border. Whatever the case, Li Guang eventually shed his pursuers, and was even able to herd together some survivors from his broken army before crossing back into Han lands. Yet, although he had survived this trial, another lay in the immediate future. Once he returned to the capital, the general would have to answer to the unforgiving Emperor Wu for his defeat and capture in battle.

When Li Guang reached the capital, he was quickly arrested by Han officials, as was Gongsun Ao, who similarly was defeated by the Xiongnu. The two were told that their conduct could merit execution, yet they were thankfully given the option to buy their freedom. Although they escaped the death penalty, they lost their military commands and government titles. After paying his own ransom in 129 BCE, Li Guang would continue to live as a commoner until around 127 BCE, when he was called back to duty by the emperor.

Written by C. Keith Hansley.

Picture Attribution: (Drawing of man on horseback shooting an arrow from the New York Public Library, [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:

• Records of the Grand Historian (Shi ji) by Sima Qian, translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
• http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Han/personsliguang.html  

The Bold Way Zhou Yafu Reportedly Earned The Respect Of Emperor Wen

Zhou Yafu was the son of Marquis Zhou Bo of Jiang (d. 169 BCE). If he was the type of man who wanted to surpass his father, he had a tough act to follow. Zhou Bo was instrumental in bringing Emperor Wen (r. 180-157 BCE) to power, and, although Zhou Bo and the emperor had the occasional tiff, he was generally a well-respected figure in the court of the Han Dynasty until his dying day.

Upon the death of Zhou Bo in 169 BCE, it was not Zhou Yafu who succeeded to the marquisate. Instead, his brother Shengzhi became the new Marquis of Jiang. Zhou Yafu, for his own part, was granted an appointment as the governor of Henei not long after his brother became a marquis. Like many second sons of noble families, he probably felt that his path up the social hierarchy would not come from inheritance, but from showing merit in government and military spheres.

Zhou Yafu was still governor of Henei when Xiongnu nomads entered the provinces of Shang and Yunzhong in 158 BCE, invading both regions with separate armies, reportedly numbering 30,000 men each. In response to the Xiongnu invasion, the emperor ordered several officials to mobilize Chinese forces and had them set up camps at certain regions in the empire. Zhou Yafu was one of the military leaders, and he was ordered to gather his forces at Xiliu.

It was at the time of the Xiongnu invasion of 158 BCE that Zhou Yafu caught the attention of Emperor Wen—and he reportedly did so in a bizarre and bold way. Emperor Wen was said to have toured the various military camps during the months-long showdown between the Xiongnu and the Chinese forces. As no major battles were reported during the conflict, the visits of Emperor Wen to his camped troops were often the most dramatic events of the invasion. According to the historian Sima Qian (c. 145-90 BCE), Emperor Wen personally visited at least three of the military encampments set up during 158 BCE, and, by far, the emperor’s visit to Zhou Yafu’s camp at Xiliu was the most peculiar.

Channeling his inner Sun Tzu, Zhou Yafu reportedly adopted the persona of a strict, no-nonsense general when the emperor came to visit. Whereas the other camps toured by the emperor had immediately opened their gates and welcomed their ruler with great pomp and celebration, Zhou Yafu’s camp was on complete lockdown. The emperor’s caravan was alleged to have been awkwardly halted before a heavily guarded gateway, and the entrance of the Xiliu camp was reportedly not opened until Emperor Wen sent a messenger to display his imperial credentials to Zhou Yafu. Yet, that was only the beginning to the general’s display of extreme military by-the-book discipline. Sima Qian described the scene: “After the guards had opened the gates one of them told the cavalry and carriage drivers accompanying the emperor, ‘The general says there is to be no galloping within the camp!’ The emperor accordingly reined in the horses of his carriage and proceeded at a slow pace to the headquarters. General Zhou Yafu appeared bearing his arms and bowed curtly” (Shi ji, 57).

Emperor Wen’s companions were said to have been outraged at Zhou Yafu’s treatment of his sovereign. The emperor, however, was immensely impressed, appraising Zhou Yafu as one of his toughest generals, as well as the military leader least likely to be tricked by Xiongnu warriors attempting to impersonate the emperor. In his assessment of Zhou Yafu, Emperor Wen was likely thinking of sayings of Sun Tzu, such as “Have a capable general, Unhampered by his sovereign” and “The general is the prop of the nation. When the prop is solid, the nation is strong. When the prop is flawed, the nation is weak” (The Art of War, chapter 3).

The Xiongnu withdrew only a few months after the invasion of 158 BCE and the Chinese armies sent to defend against the invaders were recalled from their camps. Emperor Wen soon made Zhou Yafu a palace military commander and also appointed him as Marquis of Tiao. Yet, the old emperor was at the end of his reign. When Emperor Wen was on his deathbed in 157 BCE, he reportedly advised his son, Emperor Jing (r. 157-141 BCE), to put Zhou Yafu in charge of the empire’s military. Emperor Jing did, indeed, put great trust in Zhou Yafu, making him his general of carriage and cavalry, palace military commander, grand commandant, and finally chancellor. Yet, he and Emperor Jing had a falling-out over what to do with Xiongnu defectors in 147 BCE, at which point he resigned as chancellor. A few years later, Zhou Yafu was arrested under suspicion of rebellion and he eventually committed suicide through a hunger strike.

Written by C. Keith Hansley

Picture Attribution: (19th or early 20th century depiction of Zhuge Liang (諸葛亮), styled Kongming (孔明), on top of a city wall. [Public Domain] via Creative Commons).

Sources:

• Records of the Grand Historian (Shi ji) by Sima Qian, translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
• The Art of War by Sun Tzu, translated by John Minford. New York: Penguin Classics, 2009.  
• http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Han/personszhouyafu.html